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1 Introduction 
 
International investment arbitration serves as a tool for resolving legal disputes between 
foreign investors and host states.
1
 The arbitral tribunal decides whether the host state 
fulfilled its international and national law obligations.
2
 It also establishes the right of a 
claimant, mostly the investor, to resort to arbitration and benefit from the protection 
under the treaty or contract.
3
    
  
Practice demonstrates that illegal acts committed by investors may hinder the 
performance of their procedural and substantive rights during arbitration. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the term “investment wrongdoing” refers to the illegal acts of an 
investor. Investment wrongdoing might lead to the rejection of jurisdiction or 
inadmissibility of the claim.
4
 The examples of investment wrongdoings include fraud,
5
 
                                               
1UNCTAD, Investor-state disputes : prevention and alternatives to arbitration (New York: United 
Nations, 2010), p.xxii, Christopher F Dugan et al., Investor-state arbitration (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p.117, Rahim Moloo and Alex Khachaturian, “The Compliance with the Law 
Requirement in International Investment Law,” Fordham International Law Journal 34 (September 27, 
2012): p.1474. 
2 Dugan et al., Investor-state arbitration, p.147.  
3Andrew Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct: Jurisdiction, Admissibility or Merits?,” in Evolution in 
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, ed. Chester Brown et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, n.d.), p.189.  
4 Pr. Newcombe in “Investor Misconduct” uses the term “misconduct” to describe the same set of acts.  
5 See Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID ARB/03/26 2006); Gustav F W 
Hamester GmbH & Co KG V. Republic of Ghana (ICSID ARB/07/24 2010); Plama Consortium Limited 
V. Republic of Bulgaria (ICSID ARB/03/24 2008); Spyridon Roussalis V. Romania AS (ICSID ARB/06/1 
2007); Amco Asia Et Al. V. Indonesia (ICSID ARB/81/1 1983). 
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bribery
6
 and corruption,
7
 non-observance of domestic laws of the host state,
8
 as well as 
human rights violations.
9
     
 
Investment wrongdoing might occur upon initiation
10
 or operation
11
 of investment. 
Some investors might even engage in wrongdoings in order to obtain standing before 
the arbitral tribunals.
12
 Although having different levels of severity, these acts trigger 
unsuccessful arbitral proceedings for the investor.     
  
The tribunals have failed to develop a uniform approach with respect to investment 
wrongdoing.
13
 The wrongdoings have been addressed together with the jurisdictional 
                                               
6Westinghouse International Projects Company Et Al. V. National Power Corporation (1991); J. Gillis 
Wetter, “Issues of Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True 
Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110” 10, no. 3, Arbitration 
International (1994): pp.278–279. 
7 See World Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya (ICSID ARB/00/077 2006).  
8 See Moloo and Khachaturian, “The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International Investment 
Law”; Ursula Kriebaum, “Investment Arbitration - Illegal Investments,” ed. Christian Klausegger and 
Giovanni De Berti, Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration (2010):pp.307–335.  
9 Moloo and Khachaturian, “The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International Investment 
Law,” p.1487. 
10 See Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El Salvador; World Duty Free Company Limited v 
Republic of Kenya; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v Republic of the Philippines 
(ICSID ARB/03/25 2007).  
11 See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. V. United Mexican States (ICSID ARB (AF)/00/2 2003); 
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation V. Mexico (ICSID ARB/99/2 2006).  
12 See Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v Republic of Turkey (ICSID ARB(AF)/06/2 2009).  
13 See Christina Knahr, “Investments "in Accordance with Host State Law,” Transnational Dispute 
Management 5 (2007); Andrew Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct and Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Mapping the Terrain,” Kluwer Arbitration Blog, January 25, 2010;  Michael Hwang and Kevin Lim, 
“Corruption in Arbitration - Law and Reality,” Asian International Arbitration Journal 8, no. 1:pp.1–119; 
Rahim Moloo, “A Comment on the Clear Hands Doctrine in International Law,” Transnational Dispute 
Management 8, no.1(February2011); Jason N Summerfield, “The Corruption Defense in Investment 
Disputes: A Discussion of the Imbalance Between International Discourse and Arbitral Decisions,” 
Transnational Dispute Management  6, no. 1 (March 2009);  Jason Webb Yackee, “Investment Treaties 
& Investor Corruption: An Emerging Defense for Host States” 52 (2012):pp.723–745.     
 3 
issues
14
 or affected admissibility of the investor’s claim.15 When the claim is 
admissible, the evidence on wrongdoings is taken into account on the merits phase,
16
 as 
well as when allocating costs
17
 and damages.
18
 Scholarly opinions confirm that the 
cases with investment wrongdoings lead to procedural confusion, where the line 
between jurisdiction, admissibility and merits is hard to draw.
19
   
    
1.1 Research Question 
 
This thesis aims to determine an appropriate stage for addressing investment 
wrongdoing during arbitration proceedings. It presents analysis of the decisions of 
international arbitral tribunals and consequently answers the following questions:          
   
i. How may investment wrongdoing affect the consent of the host state and 
subsequently, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal?  
ii. Does investment wrongdoing disqualify an investment for the purposes of 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal?     
iii. Which general principles apply to investment wrongdoing and what are the 
consequences of their application?     
                                               
14 Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El Salvador, para. 207; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport 
Services Worldwide v Republic of the Philippines, paras. 396–404.     
15 See World Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) V. 
the Russian Federation (PCA 2009); Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) V. the Russian Federation 
(PCA 2009).   
16 Joseph Charles Lemire V. Ukraine (ICSID ARB/06/18 2011); cited in Newcombe, “Investor 
Misconduct,” p.191. 
17 Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v Republic of Turkey, para. 177; cited in Newcombe, “Investor 
Misconduct,” p.192.  
18 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. V. the Republic of Chile, 242–243 (ICSID 2004); cited in 
Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct,” p.192.   
19 See Knahr, “Investments "in Accordance with Host State Law”; Summerfield, “The Corruption 
Defense in Investment Disputes”; Yackee, “Investment Treaties & Investor Corruption: An Emerging 
Defense for Host States”; Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct and Investment Treaty Arbitration: Mapping 
the Terrain”; Hwang and Lim, “Corruption in Arbitration - Law and Reality.”  
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The thesis shall demonstrate that investment wrongdoing is not a jurisdictional matter 
per se, unless the requirement of legality is explicit pre-requisite for the jurisdiction. 
The thesis concludes that consideration of investment wrongdoing is more appropriate 
at the admissibility or merits stage.      
      
1.2 Practical Relevance of the Research Question 
  
The decision on when to address investment wrongdoing is not a mere procedural 
formality.
20
 Determination of the appropriate stage is significant for investors, host 
states and development of investment arbitration in general. In order to demonstrate the 
importance of the research question, the distinction shall be drawn between the stages 
of jurisdiction and admissibility. It is also relevant to identify the consequences of the 
arbitration proceedings, once the issue of investment wrongdoing is considered at the 
merits stage. 
           
The jurisdiction of the international arbitral tribunal is the basis for hearing the case.
21
 
The lack of jurisdiction entails that the tribunal has no competence to deal with the 
dispute.
22
 The jurisdiction of international investment tribunal is based on several 
elements, such as jurisdiction ratione voluntatis and ratione materiae.
23
 The tribunal 
                                               
20 Dugan et al., Investor-state arbitration, p.147.     
21 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p.1; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of international investment law (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.214.  
22 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, “Law and practice of international commercial arbitration”, 2004, 
para. 5.30; Dietmar W Prager and Rebecca Jenkin, Abaclat and Others V. The Argentine Republic 
Kluwer Law International, Contribution by the ITA Board of Reporters, para. 247 (ICSID ARB/07/5 
2011).  
23 Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, paras. 13.01; 13:06; Newcombe, “Investor 
Misconduct,” pp.192–193; M Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.307.     
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has jurisdiction ratione voluntatis, once it establishes that the parties have consented to 
resolve the dispute by means of arbitration.
24
  
 
The basis for the jurisdiction of the tribunal might be found in (a) direct agreement 
between the parties;
25
 (b) national legislation of the host state;
26
 (c) bilateral or 
multilateral treaty between the host and home states.
27
 Sometimes the investor might 
bring the claim on the basis of several sources.
28
 The tribunal must establish the 
existence of consent “with great care”, since it is basis for its jurisdiction.29 If the 
tribunal decides on the issue that falls outside of the scope of consent, the award may be 
rendered void due to the excess of jurisdiction.
30
   
 
Another element of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is ratione materiae. The 
jurisdiction ratione materiae is established if the dispute in question arises out of an 
                                               
24 Dugan et al., Investor-state arbitration, p.219; Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, paras. 
5.44; 5.55; “The Scope of Investor’s Protection under the ICSID/BIT Mechanism: Recent Trends,” in 
Contemporary issues in international arbitration and mediation : the Fordham papers 2010, ed. Arthur 
W. Rovine (Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), p.33.   
25 Mobil v New Zealand (ICSID 1989); Vacuum Salt Products v Ghana (ICSID 1994); cited in 
Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, para. 11.28. 
26 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID ARB/84/3 1988); 
Tradex Hellas S.A.(Greece) V. Republic of Albania, (ICSID ARB/94/2 1996), cited in Steingruber, 
Consent in international arbitration, para. 11.28. 
27 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, pp.238–239; Steingruber, Consent in 
international arbitration, para. 11.28; Christoph H Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention a Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), para. 245.  
28 Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment, p.308.     
29 Michele Potesta, “The Interpretation of Consent to ICSID Arbitration Contained in Domestic 
Investment Laws,” Arbitration International 27, no. 2 (January 2011): p.2; Summerfield, “The 
Corruption Defense in Investment Disputes,” p.14; Dugan et al., Investor-state arbitration, p.224.        
30 Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment, p.287; See Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, 
“Corruption in Foreign Investment - Contracts and Dispute Settlement Between Investors, States and 
Agents” 9, no. 1, The Journal of World Investment & Trade (2008). 
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investment.
31
 Thus, in order to have jurisdiction the tribunal shall firstly verify that the 
transaction qualifies as an investment.
32
   
 
The issues considered at the admissibility stage are different. Decision on admissibility 
requires examination of appropriateness of judicial treatment.
33
 The tribunal reviews the 
maturity of a claim, passage of agreed time bars or fulfilment of arbitral preconditions.
34
    
 
The decision on lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility has distinct legal consequences 
and leaves investors with different future options.
35
 When the tribunal denies 
jurisdiction, the claimant loses the opportunity to re-submit the case to the same 
tribunal. Yet this does not exclude the review of jurisdiction by another body.
36
 Unlike 
jurisdiction, inadmissibility is not subject to review.
37
 However, if the claim is 
inadmissible at a certain point, the investor might resubmit the claim once it cures the 
flaw.
38
 Accordingly, contrary to the denial of jurisdiction, the lack of admissibility does 
not exclude the possibility of submitting a modified or improved claim to the same 
tribunal.         
 
                                               
31 Stern, “Contemporary issues in international arbitration and mediation,” p.33; Catherine Yannaca-
Small, International investment law : understanding concepts and tracking innovations ; companion 
volume to International Investment Perspectives (Paris: OECD, 2008), p.9.   
32 Joseph M Boddicker, “Whose Dictionary Controls?: Recent Challenges to the Term ‘Investment’ in 
ICSID Arbirtration” 25, no. 5, American University International Law Review (2010): p.1052; Gerold 
Zeiler, “Jurisdiction, Competence, and Admissibility of Claims in ICSID Arbitration Proceedings,” in 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century, ed. Christina Binder et al. (Oxford University Press, 
2009), p.10. 
33 Prager and Jenkin, Abaclat and Others V. The Argentine Republic, para. 247.  
34 William W. Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes : Studies in Law and Practice 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.77.  
35 Prager and Jenkin, Abaclat and Others V. The Argentine Republic, para. 247. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Jan Paulsson, Global reflections on international law, commerce and dispute resolution : liber 
amicorum in honour of Robert Briner ; editors, Gerald Aksen ... [et al.]. Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
(Paris: ICC Pub., 2005), p.603.   
38
 Prager and Jenkin, Abaclat and Others V. The Argentine Republic, para. 247. 
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Whether the investment wrongdoing is addressed at the jurisdictional or merits phase, is 
relevant for the states. The host states often refer to investment wrongdoings in order to 
avoid arbitration proceedings or justify their violations towards investors.
39
 If the 
tribunal concludes that it has no jurisdiction on investment wrongdoing, the merits of 
the case will not be addressed. Thus, the tribunal would not decide on whether the host 
states fulfilled obligations owned to investors. Consequently, the host states would 
avoid the arbitration proceedings altogether.
40
 On the other hand, seeing investment 
wrongdoing as jurisdictional matter, while resorting to the violations of the host states 
on merits, would give advantageous position to the host states.
41
 When an investor 
violates the law, it results in the deprivation of the arbitral remedy, whereas violation by 
the state would only be the issue for the merits.
42
    
 
The states have also successfully relied on investment wrongdoing in order to mitigate 
their own violations during merits stage.
43
 If investment wrongdoing is considered as an 
issue for substantial consideration, the tribunal would weight actions of the investors 
against actions of the host states. Consequently, the decision of the tribunal would take 
into account the actions of the both parties. The violations by the state might not be 
followed by strict consequences, if the investor itself was involved in the acts contrary 
to the applicable law.
44
  
       
The consideration of investment wrongdoings also influences the balance between the 
parties during arbitration. Currently, the BITs are mostly focused on the obligations of 
                                               
39 Knahr, “Investments "in Accordance with Host State Law”; Yackee, “Investment Treaties & Investor 
Corruption: An Emerging Defense for Host States.”  
40 Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El Salvador, para. 207; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport 
Services Worldwide v Republic of the Philippines, paras. 396–404.  
41 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v Republic of the Philippines, para. 37, Dissenting 
Opinion of Arbitrator Cremades.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil V. the Republic of Estonia; Joseph Charles 
Lemire V. Ukraine; cited in Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct,” p.191.  
44
 Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct,” p.191. 
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states, while giving only rights to investors.
45
 Therefore, during arbitration proceedings 
the assessment is mostly limited to the evaluation of the acts of the host state. 
Addressing investment wrongdoings at the stage of admissibility or merits might assist 
in reaching the equilibrium between the parties. Together with the acts of host state, the 
tribunal would have to scrutinize wrongdoings of investors.
46
   
  
Lastly, drawing the clear distinction between jurisdiction, admissibility and merits 
carries general relevance for investment arbitration. The consideration of substantive 
issues at the initial phase would inevitably extend the scope of jurisdictional issues. 
Consequently, the investor will have broader basis for challenging the awards before 
other forums.
47
 Some authors consider that misperception of jurisdiction and 
admissibility makes the awards of international tribunals “vulnerable”.48 Unnecessary 
extension of jurisdictional issues and the grounds for challenging awards undermines 
the effectiveness of investment arbitration. The trend might be that arbitral institutions 
aim at equipping the parties with the right of appealing the award.
49
 However, the scope 
of the appeal is limited
50
 and does not aim to trespass the objective – effective 
resolution of the disputes. The confusion related to investment wrongdoing creates a 
certain level of procedural uncertainty and undermines predictability. This is not 
favourable for any method of dispute resolution, especially arbitration.
51
     
       
Thus, the decision of the arbitral tribunal on the wrongdoing of investment bears 
important consequences. Together with the prospects of the parties after the dispute, it 
affects the balance between the rights and obligations of investors and host states during 
                                               
45 Yackee, “Investment Treaties & Investor Corruption: An Emerging Defense for Host States,” p.741.  
46 Ibid.   
47 Paulsson, Global reflections on international law, commerce and dispute resolution, p.601.  
48 Moloo and Khachaturian, “The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International Investment 
Law,” p.1490.   
49 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
1965, sec. 5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 William Park, “Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-operation” 12, Journal of International 
Arbitration (1995): pp.99–112; Mariel Dimsey, The resolution of international investment disputes : 
challenges and solutions (Utrecht, the Netherlands; 2008), p.119.  
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arbitration. At the same time, unjustified extension of the scope of jurisdiction 
jeopardises the finality of the arbitral awards, whereas uncertainties related to the 
consequences of wrongdoings reduce the level of predictability of arbitration.  
 
Due to these reasons, it is important to identify the circumstances when investment 
wrongdoing is strictly jurisdictional issue. In cases, where there is no explicit link to 
jurisdiction, the tribunals shall consider investment wrongdoing at the stage of 
admissibility. Provided that investment wrongdoing does not render the claim as 
inadmissible, the tribunals shall take the violations into account during merits stage.  
   
1.3 Methodology 
 
This research is not based on inter-disciplinal methodology and is strictly limited with 
the analysis of the legal issue. By evaluating the legal question from a critical 
perspective, the thesis tries to reach a solution for the legal problem that is evidenced by 
the arbitral case law.    
  
The primary source for the study was the arbitral case law, namely, the decisions of 
investment, as well as commercial arbitral tribunals dealing with investor-state disputes 
or disputes between private parties. The research also relies on the procedural rules of 
international tribunals, international treaties and conventions. As a secondary source, 
the research has resorted to the opinions of legal scholars who have interpreted the case-
law and relevant legal principles. The thesis also addresses the reports provided by the 
specialized international organizations.       
 
The research took the writings of legal scholars as a point of departure. This was 
relevant for acquiring the background information about the topic, as well as for 
identifying the legal loopholes and controversies. Consequently, the research resorted to 
the primary sources, aiming to study and evaluate reasoning of the international arbitral 
tribunals.  
   
 10 
1.4 Structure    
  
The thesis is presented in three main parts. The first part addresses the impact of 
investment wrongdoing on the consent of the host state. The issue is whether 
investment wrongdoing is capable of invalidating the consent of the host state and 
subsequently, rendering the tribunal without jurisdiction.       
   
As a second point, the thesis analyses the legality requirements in the treaties and their 
application to investment wrongdoing. This part distinguishes between the cases where 
investment wrongdoing had bearing for the jurisdiction of the tribunal, affected 
admissibility of a claim or was considered together with the merits.     
   
The third part deals with the cases where investment wrongdoing is established due to 
non-compliance with international principles. The writing refers to the cases where 
international principles were applied for substantiation of the legality of an investment, 
in order to subsequently rule on jurisdiction, admissibility or merits. This part further 
addresses the cases, where international principles serve as mitigating factors. Namely, 
their application might waive the effect of wrongdoings on jurisdiction of the tribunal or 
admissibility of the claim. If the claim of the investor satisfies the criteria for 
admissibility, the mitigating factors might further preclude the host state from defeating 
the investor on the merits.     
    
The last chapter summarizes the findings and presents concluding remarks on the 
research question.   
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2 Consent to Arbitration  
 
The jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunals rests on the agreement between the 
parties.
52
 The consensual nature of arbitration is also maintained in the investor-state 
disputes, which offers different tools for expressing the intent to arbitrate.
53
 The state 
can conclude arbitration agreement with the investor, incorporate consent in domestic 
law and/or conclude a BIT or multilateral treaty providing for arbitration.
54
 With respect 
to the impact of investment wrongdoing on consent, the first scenario is of particular 
relevance.    
       
When challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, the host state might invoke 
the argument on investment wrongdoing. Firstly, the respondent might submit that the 
main contract is null and void since it involved wrongdoing. It might further assert that 
the wrongdoing also invalidated the consent to arbitration. Secondly, the respondent 
host state could argue that consent to arbitration, expressed in the bilateral or 
multilateral treaty was limited to legal investments. Consequently, due to invalidity or 
lack of the consent, the tribunal would not have jurisdiction.          
 
The Chapter evaluates the pertinence of these arguments with respect to the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal.  
 
                                               
52 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, p.238.  
53 Gary B Born, International Arbitration : Cases and Materials (Kluwer Law International, 2011), 
p.457.  
54 Christoph Schreuer, “Consent to Arbitration,” in International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (presented at the UNCTAD, United Nations, 2003), p.6. 
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2.1 The Principle of Separability   
 
Nowadays the decisions of ICSID tribunals and the treaty-based investment arbitration 
comprise an important part of investment law. This, however, does not diminish the 
relevance of contract based arbitration. In fact, the withdrawal of Latin American 
countries from ICSID and the intention of some states to terminate investment treaties, 
promises raise of the role of contract arbitration.
55
    
 
Consent to arbitration through direct agreement might be expressed prior or after the 
origination of a dispute.
56
 Consent clauses are often broad and inclusive.
57
 The 
arbitration clause might be included in a contract that was obtained through fraud
58
 or 
bribery.
59
 In this case, one might question the legality of the arbitration clause. 
Commercial, as well as investment tribunals would resort to the principle of 
separability.
60
 The separability doctrine has been applied by a vast number of 
international tribunals.
61
 Under the doctrine, the arbitration agreement is an independent 
instrument and maintains validity, irrespective of the invalidity of contract.
62
   
  
The main question is whether investment wrongdoing can invalidate the arbitration 
clause, which is incorporated in the main contract or even concluded separately. 
Generally, if the arbitration agreement and the contract share the same flaw, they can 
                                               
55 Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment, p.301.    
56 Reynolds Jamaica Mines Limited and Reynolds Metals Company V. Jamaica, 4 ICSID Reports, 
pp.61;67 (ICSID 1974); Compañía Del Desarrollo De Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, 
p.26 (ICSID 2000); Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, para. 5.79.  
57 Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, para. 5.79.  
58 See Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El Salvador. 
59 See World Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya. 
60 Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, para. 5.90; Summerfield, “The Corruption Defense in 
Investment Disputes,” p.14; Dugan et al., Investor-state arbitration, p.226.        
61 See Lena Goldfields V. Soviet Government, 36 Cornell Law Quarterly (1930); Libyan American Oil 
Company (LIAMCO) (USA) V. Libyan Arab Republic, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1980, pp. 132-191; Elf 
Aquitaine Iran (France) V. National Iranian Oil Company (Ad Hoc Arbitration 1982). 
62
 Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, paras. 5.88; 5.92.  
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both be rendered null and void.
63
 Hypothetically, the host state could argue that its 
consent to arbitrate was tainted by the investment wrongdoing.      
  
The commercial arbitral tribunals have dealt with the impact of wrongdoing on the 
arbitration agreement in a number of cases. The practice of ICSID tribunals offers 
controversial, but interesting reasoning. Starting off with the land-mark decisions in 
commercial cases, we will further resort to the practice of investment tribunals. These 
cases provide guidance for assessing impact of wrongdoing on contractual arbitration 
clause and subsequently, jurisdiction.   
      
The first issue is whether conclusion of an agreement that presupposes wrongdoing 
could lead to invalidity. Indeed, it is argued that the validity of the arbitration agreement 
under the separability doctrine also depends on the intentions of the parties.
64
  
     
The decision of Judge Lagergren in ICC Case No.1110 is often cited by international 
tribunals and highly qualified scholars when addressing the issue of investment 
wrongdoing.
65
 When ruling on jurisdiction Judge Lagergren invoked Article V (2) of 
the NY Convention,
66
 which provides that recognition and enforcement of the award 
might be refused if: (a) the subject matter of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration 
or (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy.
67
 Subsequently, Judge Lagergren pointed out that although the presented 
documents were prima faciae legal, the agreement between the parties contemplated the 
bribing of officials for obtaining business.
68
 In the concluding part, the decision pointed 
                                               
63 Ibid.; Summerfield, “The Corruption Defense in Investment Disputes,” p.14.     
64 Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, para. 5.92.  
65 Wetter, “Issues of Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True 
Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110,” p.277.    
66 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958.  
67 Mr X, Buenos Aires v Company A, para. 3 (ICC #1110 1963).  
68
 Ibid., para. 17. 
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out that: “one party is not thereby enabled to reap the fruits of his own dishonest 
conduct by enriching himself at the expense of the other.”69   
 
Judge Lagergren denied jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the arbitration 
agreement was drafted and concluded separately from the main contract. Moreover, the 
arbitration agreement was drafted after the dispute arose between the parties.
70
 Thus, 
Judge Lagergren considered that even the contemplation of bribing involved in the main 
contract, was sufficient to render the tribunal without competence.   
    
Although the case dealt with a private individual and the company, the conclusion 
reached by Judge Lagergren has relevance in the context of contemporary investment 
arbitration. One could assume that once the investor engages in the wrongdoing such as 
bribery or corruption, this act affects the arbitration agreement. In order to be complete, 
the arbitration agreement requires the link with substantial terms of a certain 
transaction.
71
 Once the main transaction is tainted by illegality, the arbitration 
agreement could be viewed in light of the main contract. To put it differently, if the 
party would not assume to obtain the contract through illegal means, it would not have 
concluded the arbitration agreement. The weak point of this speculation is that it 
undermines the whole purpose and rationale behind the separability doctrine. This 
doctrine preserves the reliability of the arbitration. Otherwise, the parties would easily 
avoid their obligations to arbitrate.
72
 The preservation of the validity of consent given 
by the state serves the purpose of maintaining the arbitral remedy for the investor.
73
 
Thus, in my view, the contemplation of illegality alone does not suffice for invalidating 
the arbitration clause in the context of investment arbitration.  
                                               
69 Ibid., para. 21; Alexandra Diehl, “The Content of the FET Standard,” in The Core Standard of 
International Investment Protection (Kluwer Law International, 2012), p.413.    
70 Wetter, “Issues of Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True 
Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110,” p.280.  
71 Steingruber, Consent in international arbitration, para. 5.63. 
72 Janet. A Rosen, “Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and 
Compétence De La Compétence,” Fordhan Journal of International Law 17, no. 3 (2003): p.601. 
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Another issue of relevance is the bearing of the severity of the wrongdoing on the 
application of the separability doctrine. The point for consideration is whether the level 
of severity affects the independence and validity of the consent to arbitrate, and 
subsequently, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.    
 
Similar to ICC Case No.1110, the tribunal in Westinghouse International Case was 
faced with the issue of bribery and its effect on jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
74
 
The tribunal addressed the issue of application of the separability doctrine when the 
main contracts were obtained by bribery.
75
 The tribunal noted that separability is not 
absolute, since the defect of the main contract might as well relate to the arbitration 
clause.
76
 Whether the bribery relates to the arbitration clause has to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. However, in Westinghouse International Case the defendants failed 
to prove that the contracts were tainted by bribery.
77
 Thus, the tribunal did not get to 
rule on the legality of the arbitration clause.
78
  
 
Commenting on the Westinghouse International Case, Professor Wetter observed that 
the rationale behind the separability doctrine is preservation of the arbitral remedy.
79
  
The protection of this remedy is important when the main contract has been subject to 
termination. Preservation of remedy remains vital in cases where the party did not 
perform the contract because of the fraudulent actions by the adverse party. In view of 
Professor Wetter, the application of the separability doctrine in corruption cases might 
be different from ordinary cases. The author argued that the tribunal should have 
presented more credible reasoning on the application of the separability doctrine to 
cases of corruption: “The idea to extend the doctrine to embrace corruption cases in the 
                                               
74 Westinghouse International Projects Company Et Al. V. National Power Corporation, cited in Wetter, 
“Issues of Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True Meaning of 
Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110,” p.278. 
75 Wetter, “Issues of Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True 
Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110,” p.278. 
76 Ibid., pp.278–279. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p.279.  
79
 Ibid.    
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sense suggested by the Tribunal […] is not a proposition which is self-evident enough 
not to warrant serious analysis and discussion.”80   
 
This statement suggests that the application of the separability doctrine might not be 
identical to the illegal acts with different levels of severity. Since certain corrupt 
practices could be assigned to the category of severe wrongdoings,
81
 the threshold for 
substantiating the validity of the arbitration agreements in these cases might be higher.  
 
Although the severity of violation might be considered when applying the separability 
doctrine, this does not provide grounds for generalization. Indeed the practice 
demonstrates that even in cases involving corruption, the arbitration agreements have 
remained valid. The decision of the UK House of Lords in Fiona Trust Case confirms 
the statement. The case required the investigation of the operation of the separability 
doctrine with respect to corruption. The House of Lords stated that arbitration 
agreement can be void only when the grounds are directly related to the arbitration 
agreement itself. Since the corruption only related to the main contract, the tribunal 
found the arbitration agreement to be valid.
82
 Mostly the separability doctrine has been 
applied similarly.
83
 For example, in World Duty Free Case
84
 the claim was based solely 
on alleged breaches of the contract.
85
 The claimant argued that bribe was an 
independent collateral transaction and should have been considered as separate from the 
contract.
86
 The tribunal established that the bribe was neither separate nor severable 
from the Agreement.
87
 It refused to consider the secrecy of a bribe as an argument for 
                                               
80 Ibid. 
81 Mohamed Abdel Raouf, “How should International Arbitrators Tackle Corruption Issues,” in Liber 
amicorum, (Las Rozas (Madrid): La Ley, 2010), paras. 4; 6.  
82 Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and Others V. Yuri Privalov and Others, paras. 23–25; 44 
(Queen’s Bench Division 2007). 
83 Hwang and Lim, “Corruption in Arbitration - Law and Reality,” p.43. 
84 World Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya. 
85 Ibid., para. 79.  
86 Ibid., para. 174.  
87
 Ibid. 
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its separateness from the contract.
88
 Although the tribunal refused to establish the 
independence of a contract from the bribe, it did so with respect to arbitration 
agreement.
89
 The tribunal noted that there was no evidence proving that bribe has 
procured Article 9 on agreement to arbitrate.
90
    
 
The facts of the case above are remarkable. During the arbitration proceedings the 
claimant admitted that “in order to be able to do business,” it made a “personal 
donation” to the President of the host state. 91 Thus, the claimant admitted that it was 
involved in corrupt activities. Although the factual background of the case confirmed 
the existence of severe wrongdoing,
92
 the tribunal maintained the autonomy and validity 
of the arbitration agreement.
93
 The tribunal noted that it could not be disputed that the 
bribery has occurred and that it served the purpose of getting an investment.
94
 
Notwithstanding this, the tribunal established the jurisdiction and further refused to 
consider the claim.
95
 Hence, the tribunal did not question the existence of jurisdiction 
ratione voluntatis, notwithstanding the severity of investment wrongdoing. 
 
When dismissing the claim, the tribunal noted that: “The claimant is not legally entitled 
to maintain any of its pleaded claims in these proceedings as a matter of ordre public 
international and public policy under the contract's applicable laws.”96 This conclusion 
can lead to different interpretations.
97
 The denial of claim might be based on the 
illegality of the contract. In this case, one might argue that the tribunal dismissed the 
claim since it had no legal basis.
98
 This could qualify as a decision on the merits of the 
                                               
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., para. 184.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid., para. 66. 
92 Ibid., paras. 142–148. 
93 Ibid., para. 184.  
94 Ibid., para. 136. 
95 Ibid., para. 188.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Newcombe, “Investor Misconduct,” p.197.  
98
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case.
99
 On the other hand, the decision might have been based solely on public policy, 
as it is stated in the citation above. The denial could be the consequence of the admitted 
bribe that contradicted international public policy.
100
   
 
The analysis above confirms that the contractual consent of the host state might raise 
the issue of the separability of the arbitration clause, intention of the parties and severity 
of investment wrongdoing. The case law demonstrates that the tribunals are more 
inclined to support the autonomy of the arbitral remedy in the contract or compromise.  
 
To summarize, if an arbitration clause is incorporated in a contract, the investment 
wrongdoing does not per se cause the rejection of jurisdiction.
101
 When investment 
wrongdoing is solely related to the contract, the tribunal will apply the separability 
doctrine and maintain jurisdiction.
102
 Thus, the agreement to arbitrate will remain 
valid.
103
 But if investment wrongdoing affects the arbitration agreement together with 
the main contract, the tribunal may decline jurisdiction.
104
    
 
2.2 Multiple Contracts 
 
In most cases, the investment operations involve high degree of complexity. The 
transaction might consist of several contracts,
105
 Memorandums of Understanding, etc. 
                                               
99 Ibid. 
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The consent to arbitration might not be explicitly provided in all contracts related to 
investment.
106
 However, the case law confirms that the tribunals are inclined to give 
broad interpretation to the consent in these cases.
107
    
   
The deal between the foreign investor and a host state might comprise of several 
contracts, where only one contract is obtained by wrongdoing. Even if the arbitration 
clause is provided in a separate document, its validity could potentially raise 
controversies. The case law on investment wrongdoing has not dealt with this factual 
background specifically. However, a conclusion might be drawn from the decisions of 
the arbitral tribunals on complex transactions.         
   
In Duke Energy Case, the parties have concluded different contracts, however, only one 
of them referred to ICSID arbitration.
108
 The tribunal upheld the principle of “unity of 
investment” and stated that: “The reality of the overall investment, which is clear from 
the record, overcomes respondent’s objection that it could never have consented to 
arbitration of a dispute related to the broader investment.
109
 This reasoning was later 
on challenged by the respondent, Peru, through the Annulment Procedure of ICSID. 
110
 
The Annulment Committee rejected the arguments of Peru and concluded that: “ICSID 
tribunals have applied the principle of the “unity of the investment” in situations where 
consent to ICSID arbitration is found in individual investment agreements or 
contracts.”111 
 
                                               
106 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, p.239.  
107 Duke Energy International Peru Investments No.1 LTD v Republic of Peru, paras. 119–134 (ICSID 
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The reasoning in Duke Energy Case demonstrated the following: when establishing 
jurisdiction, the tribunals have applied the arbitration clause to claims arising out of 
different contracts, which were concluded within one investment.
112
 This reasoning 
could also apply to cases where the investment wrongdoing only tainted one contract 
within a complex investment transaction. Generally, the arbitral tribunals tend to view 
investment as a sole operation, which might consist of different legal transactions.
113
 
When deciding on the protection of investment, the tribunals consider all related 
transactions.
114
 Thus, provided that the contracts were directed to a specific investment, 
the principle of unity of an investment might be applied. This might lead to the 
following conclusions. Firstly, the application of the unity principle would provide 
jurisdiction with respect to any contractual claim within the frame of investment, even 
if the arbitration clause is only included in one contract. Secondly, under the principle 
of unity of investment the whole investment might be rendered as illegal, once one of 
the contracts is tainted by wrongdoing. The tribunal could establish that the wrongdoing 
re one contract tainted the entire transaction, including the one with arbitration 
agreement. This could further challenge the claimant to argue that the defect of the main 
contract was not shared by the independent arbitration agreement.     
   
As noted above, the separability doctrine serves as a presumption for the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, even if the substantive part of the contract is not valid.
115
 In cases 
where the respondent raises the issue of investment wrongdoing, the particular 
relevance shall be given to the link between the illegal act and expression of the consent 
to arbitrate. The practice highlights that the tribunals are willing to uphold the 
independence of the arbitration agreement, unless the agreement shares the flaws of the 
main contract.
116
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2.3 Consent in the BIT  
 
The consent to arbitrate is mostly expressed in international treaties, whether bilateral or 
multilateral.
117
 Thus, the expression of consent in investment arbitration is not solely 
limited to contractual relationship per se.
118
Although the consent of the parties is not 
embodied in one document, investment treaty arbitration is still based on mutual 
consent.
119
 The consent of the host state expressed in the treaty shall be met by the 
intention of the investor to arbitrate. The latter might express the consent simply by 
submitting the dispute to arbitration.
120
   
 
The states are authorized to limit their consent to arbitration and exclude certain types 
of disputes.
121
 In order to challenge the jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunal, the 
host state might argue that consent was tainted by the investment wrongdoing.
122
  
 
In the framework of the treaty-based arbitration, the law applicable to the consent is 
international law.
123
  The tribunal in Abaclat Case noted that the question of consent 
was subject to principles of international law.
124
 The principles of international law 
apply to substantial as well as formal validity of agreement to arbitrate.
125
 Since 
international law does not provide any specific guidance in this regards,
126
 the tribunal 
decided to verify the existence of written consent under Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
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Convention.
127
 It also examined whether the parties intended to submit the dispute to 
arbitration.
128
  
 
Within ICSID jurisprudence, the scope of consent has been addressed by the Inceysa 
Case. The dispute between the parties was related to the jurisdiction ratione 
voluntatis.
129
 The respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal based on the 
BIT and the contract.
130
 Primarily, the tribunal assessed jurisdiction on the basis of the 
ICSID Convention and the BIT. Secondly, it resorted to domestic legislation of El 
Salvador, including the contract between the parties.
131
 Under the facts of the case, the 
investor was accused of committing fraud.
132
 However, it did not regard these issues as 
jurisdictional objections.
133
 The claimant relied on the autonomy of the arbitration 
clause, arguing that flaws of the transaction did not relate to the agreement to 
arbitrate.
134
    
 
This case presented interesting contentions with respect to the issue of consent.
135
 The 
tribunal deemed that its fundamental task was to identify the issues which were 
included in the consent given by the respondent.
136
 Moreover, the tribunal noted that 
examination of the consent expressed by the parties was a mandatory stage for any 
tribunal.
137
  
 
This statement is helpful for identifying relevant points. Indeed the states are authorized 
to frame the scope of their consent, whereas the tribunals shall inquire into it. The 
question arises as for the effect of these boundaries on the jurisdiction of arbitral 
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tribunal. The establishment of ratione voluntatis involves more difficulty, once the 
tribunal has to confront investment wrongdoing.    
 
In Plama Case,
138
 the tribunal affirmed the autonomy of arbitration clause in the ECT. 
It stated that dispute resolution clause was independent from the ECT and the 
transaction itself.
139
 Thus, the tribunal has highlighted the application of separability 
doctrine to arbitration clauses in investment treaties. However, the establishment of the 
valid intention to arbitrate was not sufficient. There is still an element that distinguishes 
investment arbitration from ordinary commercial arbitration. The separability doctrine 
ensures the existence of ratione voluntatis in this case, yet the tribunal cannot consider 
the case without jurisdiction ratione materiae. The tribunal noted that agreement to 
arbitrate anticipates the existence of investment.
140
 Consequently, the consent cannot be 
established if there is no investment under the ECT.
141
 Although the claimant was 
accused of misrepresentations,
142
 the tribunal stated that illegality did not pertain to its 
jurisdiction and would be relevant for assessing whether the claimant could benefit 
from the substantive standards of the ECT.
143
    
 
The reasoning of the tribunal in Plama Case affirms that jurisdiction ratione voluntatis 
can be established in the presence of investment wrongdoing. The consent as such 
cannot be tainted by the wrongdoing. However, in order to ensure procedural fairness, 
the tribunal did not disregard the fraudulent actions of investor and took this into 
account on the merits stage.
144
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When the consent is provided in the BIT, the tribunal might maintain jurisdiction based 
on the separability of arbitration clause. However, the arguments with respect to the 
intention of the host state to cover only legal transactions, might serve as solid 
arguments for the rejection of jurisdiction. This question shall be considered further 
below when dealing with the jurisdiction ratione materiae.  
  
2.4 Policy Observations 
 
This section addresses general policy consequences of the rejection of jurisdiction in 
cases involving investment wrongdoing.  
 
In practice, the wrongdoing of an investor is often only one side of the illegal affair. 
Another side of the illegal act develops once the state official accepts the bribe and 
offers some favourable conditions to the investor. The question is whether the investor 
should be the only party bearing the consequences of illegality during arbitration. 
Provided that it is so, what could be the bearing of the rejection of jurisdiction or 
inadmissibility in general? One of the negative consequences of considering investment 
wrongdoing during jurisdictional phase, where it is not strictly jurisdictional matter, is 
that only one party bears the consequences for violations. If the tribunal accepts that it 
has no jurisdiction due to wrongdoing, the host state would avoid arbitration 
proceedings. Thus a state, which also participated in illegal act, would in fact benefit,
145
 
whereas the investor would be deprived of its legal remedy.    
 
In World Duty Free Case, the claimants stated that it was unfair from the respondent to 
advance the claim regarding the corruption. The tribunal did not disagree with this. In 
fact, the tribunal even highlighted that the evidence showed that the bribe was requested 
by the Kenyan President and was “not wholly initiated by the claimant.”146 The tribunal 
considered that if they would decide to grant the relief to claimant, this would 
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146
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encourage the illegal conduct.
147
 The tribunal did not draw any conclusions from the 
unwillingness of Kenya to prosecute its former president for corrupt activities.
148
 It is 
debatable whether the decision of the tribunal discouraged rather than encouraged the 
states for maintaining corrupt systems. The situation where the actions of the state are 
ignored does not contribute to the fight against corruption, nor does it promote the 
protection of foreign investment or compliance with the principle of good faith.
149
 The 
tribunal did not apply “the balancing test”, where the illegal actions by the states and 
investors would be weighted.
150
    
 
The practice shows that in most cases the states object to the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals. Even when drafting bilateral treaties, the states anticipate the possible grounds 
that might be relied in the future for challenging the jurisdiction.
151
 As for today, the 
case-law reveals that the state will avoid the arbitration proceedings and its subsequent 
outcome, once it proves the existence of investment wrongdoing.
152
 As a result, the 
state will be free of the obligation to remedy the non-performance of the contract or 
investment treaty, including the obligation to compensate.
153
 The state responsibility of 
the host state does not arise either.
154
 This tendency highlights the importance of 
reasoning of the tribunals, with respect to such investment wrongdoing as corruption or 
bribe.
155
 The state shall be encouraged to abstain from these acts. The wrongdoings 
committed by state officials shall not be free of legal consequences.
156
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Judge Lagergren noted that “parties who ally themselves in an enterprise [tainted by 
corruption] must realize that they have forfeited any right to ask for the assistance of 
the machinery of justice […] in settling their disputes.”157 Some authors argue that this 
reasoning gave the incentive, as well as legal possibility for the host states to escape 
from arbitration and resolve a dispute in a more convenient forum.
158
 For example, after 
losing the arbitration case, the Republic of Argentine reached settlement with Siemens 
AG, German multinational company. The latter refused to accept the compensation of 
200 million US dollars. In response, Argentine withdrew the case with respect to the 
wrongdoings of the company.
159
 Thus, in this case, the host state used the evidence on 
wrongdoing, in order to negotiate a favourable settlement with an investor. As a result, 
the state escaped the responsibility of paying compensation. This demonstrates that 
states are inclined to use the argument of investment wrongdoing in order to avoid 
arbitration proceedings or consequences thereof.  
 
Since most investors choose arbitration in order to avoid the corruption in judicial 
system of the host state, the maintaining of arbitral remedy carries particular 
importance.
160
 The considerations outlined above, demonstrate the necessity of 
maintaining the arbitral remedy where the legal and factual background so allows.  
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3 Requirements of Legality 
 
The states as sovereign entities have discretion to undertake as many obligations as they 
desire.
161
 They have inherited freedom to determine the level of protection granted to 
investors.
162
 Based on their sovereignty they can opt out from undertaking certain 
obligations. Thus, if states do not regard illegal transactions as investments or refuse to 
protect them under the BIT, they cannot be bound to do so. This Chapter considers the 
requirements of legality of investments incorporated in the treaties. The writing focuses 
on the following aspects: (i) the scope of legality requirements; (ii) implied and explicit 
requirements of legality; (iii) the threshold of the required compliance; (iv) the 
consequences of application.          
    
In general, substantive valid arbitration agreement is formed with an agreement to 
arbitrate and indication of legal relationship, which the parties wish to submit to 
arbitration.
163
 The definition of investment represents the basis for establishing the 
jurisdiction ratione materiae of investment tribunals.
164
 For example, the BITs present 
the list of transactions that will fall within the jurisdiction ratione materiae. The ICSID 
Convention only authorizes the tribunals to consider the cases arising “out of 
investment.”165 The tribunals under the ICSID came up with the so-called double-barrel 
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test. The test is met once the transaction qualifies as the investment under both, the 
applicable treaty and the ICSID Convention.
166
  
 
Some states enact national laws and regulations in order to attract foreign investment.
167
 
Consequently, the national legislation serves as a legal basis for the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal.
168
 In a number of cases, the tribunals have addressed the issue of 
jurisdiction provided in national legislation.
169
 National legislation might not always 
provide an actual offer to arbitrate. In some cases it might simply express the intention 
of states to negotiate an arbitration agreement when the dispute arises.
170
 The offer 
stipulated in national legislation might also contain certain limitations with respect to 
time and other formalities.
171
 Previously the consent to arbitrate was not often provided 
in the national laws,
172
 but lately the number of cases initiated on the basis of national 
legislation has increased.
173
 Notwithstanding this development, the case law has not 
specifically addressed the issue of investment wrongdoing where jurisdiction was based 
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on the national law. Therefore, the writing is focused on evaluating the legality 
requirements under the treaties and their application by the arbitral tribunals.  
 
3.1 Scope of Legality Clauses   
 
The transaction involving investment wrongdoing might or might not be covered in the 
definition of investment. The protection of investments under the treaties has certain 
limitations.
174
 The requirement of legality of investments is present in some BITs, as 
well as multilateral treaties.
175
 Most treaties use the so called “in accordance with the 
host state’s law” provisions, in order to limit the application of the treaty.176 For 
example, the BIT between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of 
Philippines reads in the respective article:  
  
“The term investment shall mean any kind of asset accepted in accordance with 
the respective laws and regulations of either Contracting State […]”177 
   
The practice of investment tribunals has revealed that “in accordance with the law of 
the host state” statement in the bilateral treaty is often regarded as a requirement of 
legality of investments.
178
 The provisions call for the compatibility with the internal 
legislation of the host state.
179
 However, they might require the compliance with the 
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principles of international law as well, since in some states international obligations are 
the part of national legislation.
180
 
 
It should be highlighted that not so long ago the tribunals were not confident about the 
scope and meaning of these clauses. The decision in Salini Case sheds some light on 
this issue. The tribunal determined that the provision refers to the compliance of 
investor with the laws of the host state, not to the definition of investment under the 
national laws. 
181
 This restriction aims to limit the application and protection of the BIT 
to investments that comply with internal law of the host state.
182
 The compliance shall 
be ensured from the stage of entry to the subsequent operation.
183
 However, the stage 
where compliance is required shall be identified on the case-by-case basis.    
 
Provided that the requirement of legality is included in the definition of investment, this 
limitation shall be considered as jurisdictional issue.
184
 When the requirement of 
compliance with law is included in other parts, such as, the provision on the applicable 
law, this shall only be regarded as an issue for the merits.
185
 Hence, non-compliance 
with this requirement will leave investment without substantial benefits, protection from 
national treatment, expropriation and etc.
186
  
 
The compatibility with the host state’s law upon the start of an investment is relevant 
for the jurisdiction.
187
 For example, in the Gustav Case the tribunal noted that if the 
contract would have been obtained on the basis of fraud, the investment would have 
been illegal and would not be protected under the BIT. Whether or not the wrongdoing 
                                               
180 See Abaclat and Others V. The Argentine Republic; Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El 
Salvador.  
181 Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. V. Kingdom of Morocco, para. 46.  
182 Desert Line Projects LLC V. Republic of Yemen, paras. 104–105 (ICSID ARB/05/17 2008).   
183 Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment, p.317. 
184 Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL V. Republic of El Salvador, para. 186. 
185 Ibid., para. 187.  
186 Abaclat and Others V. The Argentine Republic, para. 383.  
187
 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG V. Republic of Ghana, para. 127. 
 31 
occurred at the stage of performance has to be taken into account on the merits phase.
188
 
In this case, the respondent failed to prove that fraud took place. 
189
 The tribunal in the 
Gustav case interpreted the BIT and distinguished between the legality at the stage of 
initiation and performance of the investment. The Article on the scope of application of 
the BIT only required legality at the initiation of the investment. The tribunal stated that 
due to the wording provided in the treaty, the legality of initiation would have relevance 
for the jurisdiction, irrespective of the legality of performance.
190
  However, before 
assessing the jurisdictional requirements under the treaty, the tribunal made some 
general observations. It stated that generally investment would not be protected when it 
violates national or international legal principles or national law of the host state. 
191
 For 
example, when investor is accused of corruption it shall expect to lose all rights 
provided in the bilateral investment treaties. This would apply to corrupt acts committed 
at any stage of investment making.
192
  
 
3.2 Implied and Explicit Requirements 
  
International investment tribunals tend to deny protection to the investor violating the 
laws of the host state; however, the practice is not uniform.
193
 Even where “in 
accordance with the host state’s law” provisions are explicitly provided in the BIT, the 
identification of their scope and content is complicated. Firstly, the part of national 
legislation that must be applied is hard to identify.
194
 Secondly, the consequence of non-
compliance is not foreseeable.
195
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The case law also demonstrates that this requirement might be implied, even when the 
phrase as such does not appear in the BIT.
196
 Thus, the legality requirement might be 
explicitly provided in the treaty or be implied obligation under the general principles. 
The source for this obligation will find its reflection on the legal outcome.
197
  
 
The implied legality requirement was applied to the investment made under multilateral 
treaty. In Plama Case, the tribunal had to assess legality under the ECT. The ECT did 
not contain the obligation of compliance with any law. However, the tribunal noted that 
the ECT could not protect investments that contradicted domestic or international 
law.
198
 The tribunal referred to the introductory note of the ECT, which provides that 
the purpose of the treaty is to “strengthen the rule of law.”199 The tribunal inquired into 
the legality of investment on the stage of admissibility and denied the protection.
200
   
  
In Toto Case the jurisdiction was rejected on the basis of the implied legality 
requirement.
201
 The tribunal relied on the judgment in Phoenix Case, where the notion 
of investment under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention was found to imply the 
compliance with the laws of the host state.
202
 The reading of the Phoenix Case offered 
above has been criticized.
203
 However, the reasoning of Phoenix Case and interpretation 
offered by Toto Case was further overturned in Saba Fakes Case. The tribunal noted 
that the requirement of legality is not incorporated in Article 25 of the ICSID 
convention.
204
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3.3 Threshold of Illegality 
 
One of the questions raised by the “in accordance with the host state’s law” provisions 
is whether any kind of non-compliance suffices for the rejection of jurisdiction or 
inadmissibility of the claim.  
 
The decision in the Tokio Tokeles Case can be used as guidance for determining the 
threshold of the wrongdoing that might affect the jurisdiction or admissibility.
205
  The 
tribunal stated that exclusion of an investor on the basis of minor violations contradicts 
with the object and purpose of the BIT.
206
 The same was concluded by the tribunal in 
the Saba Fakes Case.
207
  The claimant argued that only violation of a “fundamental 
legal principle” would render investment as illegal.208 The respondent submitted that 
non-compliance with any law would leave the investment without the substantive 
protection of the BIT.
209
 The tribunal did not agree with the latter.
210
 The tribunal 
highlighted that (i) the BIT solely refers to the legality at the stage of admission of 
investment, and (ii) dismissing investment claims on the basis of “the violation of laws 
unrelated to the very nature of investment regulation” undermines the object and 
purpose of the BIT. 
211
   
  
The tribunal in the Saba Fakes Case raised a valid argument stating that upon violation 
of domestic laws, the host state could take measures on the basis of national legislation. 
Except when stated in the applicable BIT, the state shall not rely on domestic legislation 
to escape its international undertakings.
212
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The analysis of the Gustav tribunal is also relevant with respect to the nature and level 
of illegality. The tribunal noted that in that case there was no indication that the fraud 
affected the securing of an investment.
213
 The tribunal refused to regard the acts of the 
investor as fraudulent. The respondent failed to establish that the wrongdoing was 
decisive for the initiation of investment.
214
 The tribunal stated that the acts of the 
claimant “might not be in line with […] ‘l‟éthique des affaires’”. However, this would 
only affect the merits of the case, not the issue of existence of investment and 
jurisdiction.
215
   
 
This thesis shares the view expressed in Tokios Tokelės Case with respect to the 
threshold of illegality.
216
 On the other hand, the shortcomings of the so called “minor 
errors” test217 cannot be disregarded. Since there are no standards or principles 
differentiating between minor and severe violations for the purposes of legality 
requirements, the test leaves a room for subjective assessment by the tribunal.
218
 The 
subjective interpretation of the level of illegality does not serve the predictability or 
uniformity of arbitral decisions.   
 
3.4 Consequences of Legality Requirements 
 
The consequences of applying legality requirements are not uniform. The case law 
presented below highlights that the legality requirements might lead to different legal 
outcome.  
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The respondent in Inceysa Case argued that the BIT in question only applied to 
legitimate investments.
219
 The tribunal regarded the issue of legality as jurisdictional.
220
 
It came to a conclusion that the BIT did not protect illegal investments.
221
 When 
deciding so, the tribunal invoked the travaux préparatoires of the BIT and argued that 
the parties intended to exclude illegal investments.
222
 It is noteworthy that the tribunal 
in Inceysa Case did not regard the resolutions of the host state with respect to legality as 
decisive.
223
 The tribunal stated that this would implicitly grant the states the right to 
unilaterally withdraw the consent by determining the legality of the investment under 
their laws.
224
 The tribunal further clarified that the determination of legality was 
performed solely for asserting the competence of the panel.
225
  
 
The ICSID tribunals have developed case law with respect to the fraudulent actions in 
the field of taxation. In Spyridon Roussalis Case,
226
 the respondent argued that the BITs 
did not protect fraudulent investments. It further argued that protection of such 
investments would violate the rule of law. The BIT in question contained “in 
accordance with the host state’s law” requirement.227 The respondent also argued that 
the claimant had burden of proof that an investment was made in accordance with the 
applicable law of the host state.
228
 Since the respondent further withdrew this argument, 
the tribunal did not inquire into the matter of existence of investment.
229
 An ICSID 
tribunal has dealt with the issue of tax fraud in the AMCO Case.
230
  The judgment of the 
tribunal is remarkable since it provides guidance for the types of illegality that might be 
relevant for jurisdictional purposes. The tribunal noted that obligation of legality was 
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provided in the host state’s law; however, this obligation was not contracted with an 
investor and did not arise out of the investment. 
231
 Thus, the tribunal found that the 
issue of tax fraud was not within its competence ratione materiae.
232
 
 
“In accordance with the host state’s law” provision was also considered by the tribunal 
in the Fraport Case. The tribunal assessed whether the investment was made within the 
scope of the BIT ratione materiae.
233
 The tribunal noted that the definition of 
investment in the BIT represented lex specialis vis-à-vis Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention.
234
 It further concluded that the investment was not made in accordance 
with the law of the host state and consequently the tribunal had no jurisdiction.
235
 The 
tribunal stated that “compliance with the host state’s laws is explicit and hardly 
unreasonable requirement in the BIT.”236   
 
An interesting analysis was offered in the Phoenix Case, where the tribunal held that the 
consequence of illegality could have been the denial of the claim on the merits stage. 
However, it further highlighted that since the violation of the law by the investor was 
obvious, the tribunal would deny jurisdiction for the sake of judicial economy.
237
 The 
investment wrongdoing also resulted in the denial of jurisdiction in Alasdair Ross 
Case,
238
 where the tribunal did not consider the claims due to non-compliance with the 
law of the respondent state, Costa Rica.
239
  The tribunal noted that the diligent investor 
shall make itself sure that the transaction complied with the law of the host state.
240
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The case law presented above highlights that majority of the tribunals do not consider 
illegal investments within the scope of the BITs for jurisdictional purposes. The denial 
of jurisdiction is rather harsh punishment even for severe crimes, such as corruption.
241
 
In arbitrations where the jurisdiction is not based on the BIT or where the legality 
requirement is not explicitly stipulated, the limitations come into play through the 
general principles. These grounds shall be addressed in more detail below.  
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4 Role of General Principles  
 
The international principles are relevant for determining whether the investment 
wrongdoing results in the rejection of jurisdiction or inadmissibility of claim. In certain 
cases, international principles might even serve as exceptions to the wrongdoing and 
mitigate the effects of illegality for the purposes of jurisdiction, admissibility or merits.  
  
This Chapter aims to establish the consequences of arbitration proceedings, once the 
investment fails to comply with any of the following: international public policy, clear 
hands doctrine and good faith principle. The main question is whether application of 
these principles leads to the rejection of jurisdiction, inadmissibility or substantial 
consequences on the merits phase. This Chapter shall further address the good faith 
mistake and estoppel, which might mitigate the consequences of an investment 
wrongdoing. These principles might serve as basis for maintaining jurisdiction or 
establishing admissibility in the cases where the wrongdoing would lead to the contrary.        
     
The interpretation of investment treaties cannot be isolated from the general principles 
of international law.
242
 Foreign investment is not only required to meet the requirements 
of the law of the host state.
243
 Compliance with international principles equally affects 
the protection under the BIT and multinational treaties.
244
 Some multilateral treaties, 
such as the ECT
245
 and the ICSID Convention,
246
 as well as BITs,
247
 directly refer to the 
                                               
242 Stern, “Contemporary issues in international arbitration and mediation,” p.42.  
243 Ibid., p.43. 
244 Moloo and Khachaturian, “The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International Investment 
Law,” p.1474.   
245 ECT, 1998, Article 26 (6). 
246
 ICSID Convention, Art. 42(1).  
 39 
general principles of international law. The relevance of international principles was 
confirmed in Ioannis Kardassopoulos Case.
248
 The tribunal decided on compliance of 
investment with the law of the host state “in accordance with applicable rules and 
principles of international law.” 249 
 
4.1 International Public Policy 
 
The concept of international public policy is characterized by ambiguity.
250
 It can be 
confined to violation of fundamental conceptions of legal order; a set of principles that 
carries essential importance for a certain society.
251
 The divergence in terminology adds 
to the confusion. The word “international” does not connote that these principles are 
common to many countries. In fact, the content of international public policy might 
vary from one state to another.
252
 The principles shared by the legal systems of different 
countries are referred to as transnational public policy.
253
 This concept is narrower but 
more uniform than international public policy.
254
 The tribunal in World Duty Free Case 
defined international public policy as “international consensus as to universal 
standards and accepted norms of conduct that must be applied in all fora.”255 The 
decision further used the terms international public policy and transnational public 
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policy interchangeably.
256
 When referring to national or international principles, this 
thesis shall use the term international public policy.  
 
The international arbitral tribunals have often referred to public policy in the context of 
investment wrongdoing. Generally, illegal investments may be considered as contrary 
to international public policy and be excluded from the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunals.
257
 However, it does not mean that any criminal conduct by a foreign investor 
deprives the tribunal of its jurisdiction.
258
 The scope as well as the consequences of 
application of international public policy shall be addressed below.  
  
4.1.1 Applicability 
 
The rationale behind the application of international public policy might be different in 
commercial and investment arbitration. In commercial cases, the tribunals tend to verify 
the compliance with the public policy in order to avoid unenforceability of the 
awards.
259
 In investment treaty arbitration, the tribunal consults public policy as the law 
applicable under the auspices of public international law.
260
     
 
The public policy issues generally arise when dealing with fraud and bribery.
261
 The 
investors aim to reduce the application of national law, since the bilateral or multilateral 
treaty creates more favourable conditions for an investment. The host state cannot 
escape its obligations under international public policy by invoking its internal 
legislation. These principles would apply irrespective of whether they are integrated in 
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the internal legislation of the host state.
262
 Although generally favourable for investors, 
these principles work against investors involved in wrongdoings.   
 
The applicable law carries vital importance for the outcome of the dispute.
263
 The 
arbitral tribunals have relied on different sources to bring in the principle of 
international public policy. Generally, the sources of public policy are fundamental 
principles of natural law, universal justice, jus cogens, the general principles of morality 
accepted by civilized nations, international custom, arbitral precedent and the spirit of 
international treaties.
264
  
 
For example, the tribunal in the Inceysa Case stated that “in accordance with the host 
state’s law” clause in itself was a demonstration of the applicability of the public policy. 
It subsequently concluded that protection of fraudulent investment would violate this 
principle.
265
 The tribunal in the World Duty Free Case noted that the rules of public 
policy shall be prudently identified in international conventions, comparative law and 
arbitral awards.
266
 The tribunal relied on domestic laws, international conventions, as 
well as case-law of courts and tribunals and concluded that bribery was contrary to 
international public policy of most states.
267
  
 
Some scholars argue that where dispute resolution and substantive provisions are 
provided in international treaties, international tribunals are obliged to apply 
international public policy. The tribunals can hardly ignore the fundamental interests 
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protected by international law.
268
 The international public policy is also relevant when 
the dispute is solely based on the contract. For example, the tribunal in World Duty Free 
Case applied international public policy together with public policy considerations of 
Kenya and the UK.
269
   
 
4.1.2 Consequences of the Application 
 
The outcome of application of international public policy differs in accordance with the 
cases. Judge Lagergren stated that it could not arbitrate a dispute since it arose out of 
contract that was against international public policy.
270
 In that case, the Judge regarded 
corruption as an “international evil” which contradicted good morals and international 
public policy shared by international community.
271
 Judge highlighted that the decision 
on the rejection of jurisdiction was based on general principles and not on national rules 
on arbitrability.
272
  
 
In Inceysa Case, the tribunal ruled on the legality of investment and denied jurisdiction. 
The tribunal found that fraudulent investments were not protected under the BIT. The 
tribunal applied international public policy as a principle of private international law.
273
 
Some authors consider that this could generate uncertainties.
274
 The author finds the 
application of public policy, as principle of public international law, more pertinent.
275
 
In Burkina Faso Case, the tribunal had to deal with fraudulent misrepresentation.
276
 The 
respondent argued that the agreement concluded between the host state and an investor 
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violated public policy. The Tribunal held that in order to determine the legal 
consequences of this misrepresentation, it had to apply the principles beyond the 
internal public policy of the host state. The tribunal found that the agreement was null 
and void on the basis of violation of public policy and denied jurisdiction.
277
 
 
In contrast with the previous cases, the World Duty Free Case did not invoke 
international public policy before considering the issue of admissibility. The contract 
was voidable because it was procured by corruption, and was eventually set aside by the 
victim of corruption, Kenya.
278
 When reaching the conclusion on admissibility, the 
tribunal refused to consider the argument of claimant with respect to the corruption 
being common business practice in the host state.
279
 The tribunal stated that the 
widespread corrupt practices did not alter legal consequences of this wrongdoing.
280
 It 
further refused to uphold the claims based on both: contracts of corruption or the ones 
obtained by corrupt practices. 
281
 The irrelevance of the frequency of corruption was 
also highlighted in ICC Case #3916, where the tribunal stated that notwithstanding the 
presence of corruption in business practice, it is impossible to ignore the negative 
impact of such acts.
282
 
 
The application of international public policy might render the tribunal without 
jurisdiction.
283
 The tribunal would assess the validity of the contract on the basis of 
international public policy in order to find its jurisdiction. However, the resort to public 
policy considerations leads to the substantive assessment, which is not pertinent on the 
jurisdictional stage.
284
 The application of international public policy may be more 
pertinent once the tribunal addresses the merits of the case.  
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4.2 Clear Hands Doctrine 
 
The status of the clear hands doctrine as of a principle of international law has been 
disputed, however, the essence of this doctrine has been provided in the BITs and 
decisions of international tribunals.
285
 The requirement of legality for investments is 
considered as a reflection of the clean hands doctrine.
286
 As noted above, illegality does 
not lead to the lack of jurisdiction in all cases. For example, if illegality took place after 
the investment was made, the claims shall not be bared.
287
 
 
The clear hands doctrine requires the parties to the dispute to appear before the court or 
tribunal with clean hands.
288
 Consequently, illegal conduct might render the party 
without locus standi in judicio.
289
 The doctrine equally applies to the acts of states and 
investors.
290
 The application of clear hands doctrine might bar the consideration of 
claims that are related to investment wrongdoing.
291
 Generally, this doctrine applies at 
the stage of admissibility.
292
 International arbitral tribunals refer to this obligation, 
without mentioning the name of the doctrine.
293
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In the Yukos Case, the respondent, the Russian Federation, argued that claims should 
have been rejected due to “unclean hands”. The tribunal maintained jurisdiction and 
addressed the issue only on the merits stage.
294
 Some authors suggest that this implied 
the consideration of effects of wrongdoings at the admissibility phase.
295
 Arguably, if 
the investor commits wrongdoing, the claims will be inadmissible under the doctrine.
296
    
 
The practice on the application of the clear hands doctrine is scarce in this context. 
However, based on the case above, it can be concluded that its violation would in most 
circumstances be addressed at the substantial stage and might lead to the inadmissibility 
of the claim.   
 
4.3 Good Faith 
 
Another principle that can be often found in the decisions regarding investment 
wrongdoings is the principle of good faith. Along with international law, the good faith 
principle is specifically applicable within the scope of international investment law.
297
  
 
The principle of good faith in itself can be applied in investment arbitration in two 
distinct ways. Good faith might apply to the context and way in which investment was 
made.
298
 This is regarded as material good faith. Secondly, observance of good faith 
might be relevant when filing a claim in international arbitral tribunal in pursuit of 
protection of investment. This is called procedural good faith.
299
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When relying on material good faith, tribunals follow different approaches. Some 
consider the compliance with good faith at jurisdictional stage
300
, while others apply 
good faith for assessing merits.
301
 Good faith principle is linked with the issue of 
jurisdiction, where it relates to the consent. To be more precise, the tribunal might 
decline jurisdiction, if the consent of the host state does not extend to investments 
breaching the principle of good faith.
302
 Good faith principle might apply to the merits, 
when the tribunal has established jurisdiction and considers whether investment shall 
benefit from standards of protection.
303
  
 
Procedural good faith might be relevant for the stages of jurisdiction and admissibility. 
Good faith is regarded as an issue of jurisdiction, where procedural aspects are 
considered as key components for establishing the consent of the host state. Good faith 
is linked with admissibility, “where the key question is the way in which the investor 
initiated the proceedings, although in accordance with the applicable provisions, aim to 
obtain a protection, which he is – under the principle of good faith – not entitled to 
claim.
304
 
 
The principle of good faith is rooted in international law
305
 and carries vital importance 
for inter-state relations.
306
 This principle is stipulated in a number of international 
instruments.
307
 Good faith has been invoked when evaluating the obligations of states, 
as well as investors.
308
 The arbitral tribunals have invoked the following definition of 
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the good faith principle: “…good faith means absence of deceit and artifice during the 
negotiation and execution of instruments that gave rise to the investment. 
309
  
 
The role of the principle in the cases of wrongdoings is not as clear. The ambiguity 
arises as for the basis of applying the principle of good faith and consequences of its 
application. This part shall address two distinct ways in which the principle of good 
faith might appear in the decisions of international tribunals. The good faith principle 
might be the requirement applied to the acts of the host state in order to determine the 
compliance. Thus, the tribunal might find that the investor violated the principle with 
investment wrongdoing and subsequently, reject the jurisdiction, deny admissibility or 
refuse protection on the merits. Good faith principle might as well assist the investor to 
mitigate the results of its wrongdoings, once it established that the wrongdoing was 
committed as a good faith mistake.  
 
4.3.1 Application 
 
The decisions of international arbitral tribunals have resorted to different sources to 
bring in the principle of good faith. As a result, the arbitral case law has acquired 
controversial approaches towards its application.  
  
The most debatable line of reasoning was introduced by the tribunal in the Phoenix 
Case. The tribunal stated that the definition of investment under the ICSID Convention 
required “assets invested bona fide.”310  The tribunal noted that “in accordance with the 
host state’s law” provisions do not alter the requirements under the ICSID convention. 
What they do is to explicitly state the requirement of investing in good faith.
311
  
 
This approach was later overturned by the decision in Saba Fakes Case. The tribunal 
ruled that the principle of good faith could not be incorporated in the definition of 
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investment under the ICSID Convention. The tribunal stated that investment might as 
well be illegal or carried out in bad faith, but it would still be qualified as investment.
312
 
 
The tribunal in Inceysa case used another approach to bring in the principle of good 
faith. It stated that BIT, being the law of El Salvador under the constitution, was the law 
applicable to the investment. Thus, the legality should have been assessed vis-à-vis the 
BIT.
313
 Since the BIT, in turn, made a referral to rules and principles of international 
law and national law of the host state, the tribunal decided to apply the former.
314
 
Consequently, the good faith applied as a principle of international law. The tribunal in 
the Plama Case held that the claimant’s conduct was contrary to the principle of good 
faith both under Bulgarian and international law.
315
 
 
4.3.2 Good Faith as a Requirement  
 
The tribunal in the Phoenix Case stated that the investor cannot be given protection if it 
is against general principles of international law, including the principle of good 
faith.
316
 In Cementownia Case the tribunal concluded that the claimant acted in 
violation of good faith and rejected jurisdiction. The tribunal also decided to order the 
payment of the costs to the claimant.
317
 Violation of the principle of good faith, together 
with the national law of the host state, equally resulted in the rejection of jurisdiction in 
the Inceysa case.
318
 The principle was violated by fraudulent acts during the public 
bidding.
319
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Scholars suggest that the any violation could be construed as contradicting the principle 
of good faith. Investments that are illegal shall be deprived of the substantive 
protection. 
320
 
 
In accordance with the decision of the tribunal in the Fraport case, the favourable 
principles of international law are inapplicable where investor does not act in good 
faith.
321
 Violation of the good faith principle was deemed to affect the right to benefit 
from substantive protection of the treaty in the Plama Case.
322
 
 
 
The application of the good faith principle might benefit the integrity of investment 
arbitration; its application might encourage the parties to conduct their relations in a due 
manner. Nevertheless, the source of its application, as well as legal consequences shall 
be better defined. When referring to the principle of good faith, the ICJ observed that: 
“[good faith] is not in itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise 
exist.”323 Therefore, the application and consequences of this principle require the 
proper level of substantiation from the tribunals.   
 
4.3.3 Good Faith Mistake 
 
The mistake committed in good faith can excuse investment wrongdoing and mitigate 
the consequences of violation.
324
 The tribunal in the Fraport Case came up with two 
indicators that would justify application of good faith for excusing the investment 
wrongdoing.
325
 The mistake would be made in good faith, when: (i) the responsible 
counsel fails to draw attention of an investor to the legal requirement; or (ii) the 
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wrongdoing “was not central to the profitability of the investment.”326 In the latter case 
it shall be proved that the level of profitability of investment would not be altered by 
compliance with the host state’s law.327 Hence, the investment wrongdoing that was 
exercised without bad faith intentions shall not leave the investor without protection of 
international investment law.
328
 The judgment in the Fraport Case referred to the real 
circumstances, which might be confronted by the foreign investor in the host state.
329
 
The tribunal noted that the laws of the host state might lack clarity causing the good 
faith mistake of an investor.
330
   
 
The reasoning of the tribunal in the Fraport Case found reflection in other decisions. 
The Desert Line Case referred to the Fraport Case, when dealing with the legality of 
investment under Oman-Yemen BIT.
331
 The case reformulated the second indicator of 
the Fraport tribunal and questioned whether the investor would get the required 
certificate if it were aware of the necessity to do so.
332
 The tribunal decided that if 
investor knew about the requirement it would have complied with it.
333
 Therefore, the 
claimant was entitled to resort to arbitration
334
 and the tribunal had jurisdiction.
335
 
 
It is noteworthy that the level of legal culture, as well as bureaucracy and lack of 
transparency has often caused confusion or mistakes of investors.
336
 The investor has a 
right to “reasonable reliance” with respect to the host state’s understanding of its own 
laws.
337
 In cases above the tribunals applied the legality clauses in the BITs, since their 
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jurisdiction was restricted to legal investments only.
338
 The application of good faith 
mistake without explicit legality provisions is not clear. Some authors consider that if 
legality does not stand as a limitation to jurisdiction, the good faith mistake shall apply 
to the admissibility of claim.
339
  
 
The rationale behind mitigating investment wrongdoing, when investor did not intent to 
trespass the laws of the host state, seems reasonable. However, the application of the 
principle has not been substantially justified.
340
 Invocation of mitigating circumstances 
“from the air”341 might pose risks to the uniform application of this mitigating principle 
in the future.  
 
In certain political systems the governments do not take actions for precluding the 
investment wrongdoing, even though they possess information about their conducts. 
Notwithstanding the violations, investors have the opportunity to continue their work 
without legal consequences.
342
     
 
4.4 Estoppel 
 
The application of some international principles might serve as the basis for avoiding 
the consequences of investment wrongdoing during arbitration. One of these principles 
is the estoppel.
343
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The investor claims might be dismissed due to non-compliance with international legal 
principles. However, international law maxims might as well save the potentially 
unsuccessful claim of the party. In fact, principles of international law might mitigate 
the effects of investment wrongdoing. This issue is relevant with respect to the research 
question, since the application of the mitigating factors might affect the reasoning of the 
tribunal on jurisdiction or admissibility.  
 
The concept of mitigation with respect to investment wrongdoing was firstly introduced 
in the Fraport Case. The tribunal stated that when assessing the compliance with the 
law of the host state, the jurisdiction ratione materiae could be defined in “a more 
liberal way”. In view of the tribunal, this approach would be “generous to the 
investor.”344 Together with framing the good faith mistake as a mitigating factor, the 
Fraport tribunal also referred to the estoppel. The tribunal noted that certain acts of the 
host state might be considered as an acceptance of the investment wrongdoing that 
violates the law.
345
  The tribunal stated that application of the estoppel is required by the 
procedural fairness, where the government consciously ignored the violations of its 
laws and endorsed an investment.
346
 In these circumstances the government must be 
estopped to invoke investment wrongdoing as a ground for challenging the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal.
347
 Although the Fraport tribunal introduced two mitigating 
factors, it concluded that none of the two applied to the investor in that case.
348
 The 
reasoning was based on the unawareness of the claimant’s wrongdoing by the 
respondent. Thus, the estoppel could not apply.
349
 The tribunal consequently denied 
jurisdiction ratione materiae.
350
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Provided that the state knew about the violations of its domestic laws and remained 
silent, it could not raise the argument of wrongdoing for its defence during 
arbitration.
351
  
 
Some scholars are sceptical about the application of estoppel in investment arbitration, 
especially when dealing with serious wrongdoings, such as corruption. It is indeed 
questionable whether the state should be precluded from raising the issue of investment 
wrongdoing, if it was aware of this illegality or should have known about it.
352
   
 
With respect to estoppel, corruption raises particular questions. Most corruption cases 
involve the public officials, implying that the state official is aware of the wrongdoing. 
If this awareness is attributed to the state, the investor could rely on estoppel for 
mitigating its illegal acts.
353
  The escape from this unfair result might be the application 
of international/transnational public policy. Corruption is against the public policy, 
therefore, knowledge or involvement of a state official would not preclude the state to 
put forward the argument on investment wrongdoing. The consequence contrary to this 
would undermine the purpose of legality clauses.
354
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5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysis presented above highlights that investment wrongdoing raises legal, as 
well as general policy considerations in investment arbitration. Even when ruling on 
procedural matters, the arbitral tribunals affect the development of arbitral practice and 
frame future trends of the field. The impact of the decisions concerning investment 
wrongdoing is not limited to the roles of investors and the host states during arbitration. 
In reality, the decisions might encourage or dispirit illegal practices within states and 
multinational corporations.   
 
The importance of the role of arbitral practice in this field obviates the difficulty of the 
task. The arbitral tribunal has to reach balance between different values. It has to 
preserve the arbitral remedy for the investor and at the same time, provide adequate 
response for the violation of the rules of international and domestic law. The only tool 
that can assist in reaching the balance in these cases is the proper application of the 
procedural and substantive rules. 
 
In order to ensure the in-depth analysis of the issue, three questions were presented at 
the outset. These questions approached the research issue from different angels, in order 
to fully address all possible implications.  
 
i. How may investment wrongdoing affect the consent of the host state and 
subsequently, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal? 
 
The case law of international arbitral tribunals leads us to the conclusion that 
investment wrongdoing might become the basis for the rejection of jurisdiction due to 
the lack of consent. However, the distinction must be made between the consent 
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expressed in the arbitration agreement and the consent provided in the treaty. When the 
consent is presented in the contract or the compromise, the tribunal might reject 
jurisdiction upon establishing that the agreement to arbitrate was also obtained by the 
wrongdoing. The evidence to the contrary, would lead to the establishment of the 
jurisdiction, whereas the wrongdoing would only maintain relevance for the merits.  
 
In cases where the respondent challenges the jurisdiction of the arbitration under the 
BIT, the tribunal would have to assess the scope of the consent. The case law leads us to 
the conclusion that the states are authorized to limit their consent to investments without 
wrongdoings. However, the scope of consent and the intentions of the parties upon 
conclusion shall be assessed.  
 
ii. Does investment wrongdoing disqualify an investment for the purposes of 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal?     
  
The answer to this question stands as a cornerstone for the intersection of investment 
wrongdoing and arbitration. As for now, the case law can provide guidance about the 
potential conclusions that might be reached in the framework of different factual and 
legal backgrounds. The legality requirements in the BITs might lead to the rejection of 
the jurisdiction where the requirement is included in the definition of investment. This 
clause carries relevance for the establishment of jurisdiction, since the tribunal has to 
verify whether investment at hand meets the definition. However, if the requirement of 
legality is provided in other parts of BITs, it might solely limit the application of 
protection standards on the merits.  
 
This thesis supports the view that the tribunals should be prone to maintain jurisdiction, 
where the law and facts so allow. The room for improvement in this regard lies within 
the set of decisions, where the legality requirements were applied on an implicit basis. 
The denial of jurisdiction devoid of stipulated basis, even when warranted by 
international principles, undermines the object and purpose of investment arbitration. 
These decisions introduce the trend of unpredictability, lack of substantiation and 
encourage unfair speculations from the parties. Indeed the wrongdoing shall be 
addressed. However, where there is no explicit requirement in the BIT or national 
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legislation, the tribunals shall only resort to the legality at the admissibility or merits 
stage.    
 
The preservation of the object and purpose of investment arbitration and particular 
investment treaties require the careful examination of the severity of wrongdoing. 
Deprivation of an international legal remedy on the basis of minor errors, might lead to 
the far-reaching arguments from the host states. The tribunals shall view the severity of 
the wrongdoing as one of the determinant factors, where the predominant value shall lie 
within the maintenance of the remedy and consequently, jurisdiction.   
 
iii. Which general principles apply to investment wrongdoing and what are the 
consequences of their application?  
 
The case law demonstrates that the arbitral tribunals are inclined to apply international 
principles. The maxims of international law assist in framing the content and rationale 
behind the explicit or implicit requirements of legality. The application of international 
public policy, good faith or clear hands doctrine has not been uniformly linked to the 
admissibility stage. This thesis supports the view that the application of these principles 
shall be limited to the substantial consideration of the dispute. This is supported by the 
procedural, as well as policy considerations.  
 
Where these principles apply as mitigating factors at jurisdictional stage, they might 
assist to limit the superfluous application of legality requirements. These principles 
provide the possibility of viewing the wrongdoing in the relevant context, which is 
crucial for reaching the accurate conclusion.   
 
The outcome of the cases involving investment wrongdoing can be summarized in three 
basic points. When confronting investment wrongdoing, the tribunal might either deny 
jurisdiction or refuse to apply protection under the standards provided in the BIT. 
Provided that the wrongdoing does not deprive an investment of the substantive 
protection of the BIT, the host state might invoke the illegality in order to justify its 
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actions with respect to investment.
355
 The investment wrongdoing should indeed be 
followed by adequate legal consequences, but so should the violations of the host state. 
The reasonable balance must be reached between avoiding the impunity and denial of 
the remedy to investor.
356
    
 
This thesis identified the circumstances where the rejection of jurisdiction on the basis 
of investment wrongdoing might be justified by factual or legal considerations. 
However, in cases where the link between the jurisdictional requirements and 
wrongdoing is not established, this issue shall only be invoked for the purposes of 
admissibility or merits.   
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